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AN EMPLOYMENT SYSTEMS APPROACH TO TURNOVER: 
HR PRACTICES, QUITS, DISMISSALS, AND PERFORMANCE 
Abstract 
This study examines the relationship between alternative approaches to employment 
systems and quits, dismissals and customer service, based on cross-sectional and longitudinal 
data from nationally representative surveys of call center establishments. Contrary to prior 
literature, the antecedents and consequences of quits and dismissals are quite similar. Comparing 
three dimensions of employment systems, we find that high involvement work organization and 
long-term investments and inducements are associated with significantly lower quit and dismissal 
rates, while short term performance-enhancing expectations are related to significantly higher 
quit and dismissal rates. Establishments with higher quit and dismissal rates have significantly 
lower customer service, as reported by managers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Turnover is among the most important employment relations outcomes for both 
employees and organizations. Employees face the uncertainties of job search and potential 
unemployment. Organizations confront uncertain costs and benefits: The costs of operational 
disruption and replacement of human capital versus the benefits of lower-cost labor, or fresh 
skills to compete on innovation. These uncertainties raise the question of which management 
practices increase turnover; how much turnover is harmful or beneficial, and under what 
conditions and why? These questions have spawned a small, but growing set of organization 
level studies of the antecedents and consequences of turnover. This research complements the 
large micro-organizational literature on how and why individuals choose to quit their jobs 
(Griffeth, Hom, & Gaertner, 2000; Hom & Griffeth, 1995; Maertz & Campion 2004). 
However, research has largely focused on the issue of voluntary turnover, or total turnover 
more generally, neglecting involuntary turnover in the form of dismissals. Here, we define 
dismissals as employer decisions to fire individual employees, rather than decisions to cut costs 
through mass layoffs, downsizing, early retirement buyouts, or organizational restructuring. The 
few existing studies of dismissals have conceptualized them as distinct from quits, with different 
antecedents and consequences (Dalton & Todor 1979; Donaghue & Castle, 2006; Knight & 
Latreille, 2000; Shaw et al. 1998). While dismissals are viewed as the result of hiring errors, 
which employers may correct by terminating poor performers, quits are seen as a relatively 
rational process in which employees weigh their current job against alternative prospects. The 
literature often assumes that quits undermine performance because better performers are more 
likely to quit than poor performers, but theory and evidence are equivocal (McEvoy & Cascio, 
1987; Osterman, 1987; Trevor, Gerhart, & Boudreau, 1997). 
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This paper draws on an alternative perspective, internal labor market theory (Doeringer & 
Piore 1971; Osterman, 1987), which focuses on how employers establish sets of internal 
administrative rules (e.g., HR practices or employment systems) to advance their goals. Here, 
quits and dismissals are viewed as related phenomena with similar antecedents deriving from the 
type of employment system that employers choose. Employers may manage turnover levels via 
their choice of HR practices; and the optimal turnover level may vary by market, industry 
conditions (Abelson & Baysinger, 1984), business strategy, or values (Baron, Burton, & Hannan, 
1996). Cost-focused firms, for example, may use high turnover to minimize labor costs. Jack 
Welch at GE, by contrast, built a ‘performance culture’ through an explicit policy of dismissing 
10 percent of employees each year (Welch, 2005: 37-52). 
To investigate these alternative theories, we examine the relationship between quits and 
dismissals and three dimensions of the employment system: work organization, commitment-
inducing long term incentives, and performance-enhancing short-term incentives. We also 
explore their relationship to customer satisfaction, an increasingly important outcome for firm 
competitiveness (Fornell, Van Amburg, Morgeson, & Bryant, 2005; Lovelock & Wirtz, 2005). 
We draw on a 2003 national survey of US call centers, as well as longitudinal data for a subset of 
these establishments. Call centers are an appropriate context for this study because high rates of 
turnover are a major source of high costs and poor service quality. Despite off-shoring trends, 
they also employ over 4 million workers in interactive voice services (3 percent of the US 
workforce), compared to less than 400,000 comparable employees in India and the Philippines 
(Batt, Holman, & Holtgrewe, 2009: 465). 
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The theory that quits and dismissals have distinct antecedents draws on the early work of 
Dalton and others, who distinguished between ‘functional’ turnover (where poor performers 
leave) and ‘dysfunctional’ turnover (where high performers leave) (Dalton, Krackhardt, & Porter 
1981; Abelson & Baysinger, 1984). Dismissals are equated with functional turnover while quits 
are equated with dysfunctional turnover (Jacofsky, 1984; Sturman, Trevor, Boudreau, & Gerhart, 
2003). McElroy and colleagues, for example, argued that, “Dismissals are a function of poor 
individual performance or of insubordination….” (2001:1294). Shaw and colleagues noted that, 
“In an organization with high quit rates, for various reasons employees find it more attractive to 
leave than to stay. In an organization with high discharge rates, however, presumably incorrect 
hiring decisions are remedied through termination” (1998:512). Of course, poor performance 
also may be due to other factors than hiring errors – new production systems may render 
employee skills obsolete, employee motivation or commitment may change. 
The assumption that quits and dismissals have distinct antecedents is theoretically 
plausible, but has not been systematically tested, and existing studies show mixed results. 
Wanous, Stumpf, and Bedrosian (1979) found that job attitudes and performance were 
significant predictors of both types of turnover, but job attitudes explained more variance for 
quits, and performance more variance for dismissals. Organizational factors (job training and 
pay) accounted for the most variance for both types of turnover. Stumpf and Dawley (1981) 
found that absenteeism and job performance significantly explained the incidence of both quits 
and dismissals, but absenteeism explained a higher proportion of variance in dismissals. 
Recent organization-level research also provides mixed results based on industry-specific 
studies of trucking (Shaw et al. 1998) and nursing homes (Donaghue & Castle, 2006). Donaghue 
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and Castle (2006) found several differences between quits and dismissals, but noted that “…most 
of the organizational characteristics held similar associations to voluntary and involuntary 
turnover….” (2006:467). Shaw and colleagues (1998) argued that commitment-enhancing 
investments and inducements (higher pay, benefits, job stability, training) should lower quit 
rates, while performance-enhancing HR practices (electronic monitoring, longer work hours) that 
raise the expectations of employee effort and accountability should increase quits. By contrast, a 
third HR practice -- the staffing system (selection procedures, performance appraisals) -- should 
only affect dismissals. While some of their predictions were confirmed, the paper raised other 
questions. Why should performance-enhancing practices only affect quit rates, when these 
practices should uncover weaknesses in poor performers, leading to their dismissal? Similarly, 
why should better selection procedures only affect dismissals, when quit rates depend on getting 
the right ‘fit’ between the individual and the organization? 
Existing research, therefore, leaves many questions unanswered and suggests that other 
theories may help explain these relationships. Osterman, for example, argued that employers 
view turnover “…as a strategic variable – part of a larger set of personnel policies that the firm 
manipulates to achieve its ends…. In some models, the firm … explicitly considers and chooses 
the level of turnover along with other characteristics of the employment system” (1987: 289-90). 
Firms that choose to compete on service quality or customer loyalty may seek to keep turnover 
low, as research suggests that quality is higher where turnover is lower – due to employee 
motivation (Schlesinger & Heskitt, 1991) or to the firm-specific skills and knowledge of 
customers that experienced workers have (Batt, 2002). By contrast, a high turnover model may 
be acceptable or even desirable for cost-focused firms if lower operational costs outweigh higher 
turnover costs. In his classic defense of the production-line approach to services, Levitt (1972) 
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argued that efficiency and profitability would be higher if service industries adopted more 
standardized work processes – processes that also create more monotonous, high turnover jobs 
(Schlesinger and Heskitt, 1991). Of course, not all firms think strategically about turnover; and 
many, particularly those facing weak competitive markets, may use ‘bad’ or unproductive 
management practices (Bloom & Van Reenen, 2007), which are likely to result in high turnover. 
In the sections below, we examine specific HR practices, and their theoretical relationship 
to quits, dismissals, and operational performance. Theory is more well-developed for quits than 
for dismissals (Griffeth, Hom, & Gaertner, 2000; Hom & Griffeth, 1995; Maertz & Campion 
2004). Employees quit when they are dissatisfied with HR practices and working conditions; 
and their quitting raises labor costs and disrupts operations. Employees are dismissed, by 
contrast, when HR policies allow employers to identify weak performers or lead employees to 
perform badly, ultimately leading to their dismissal. This may occur in two ways. Some HR 
practices, such as performance monitoring, provide information that allows poor performers to 
be more accurately identified and dismissed. Other HR practices create more demanding or 
onerous work, leaving the less-able more exposed to discipline, and ultimately dismissal. 
We analyze three sets of HR practices, rather than HR practices taken as a coherent bundle, 
because prior research suggests that they have potentially different effects (Appelbaum, Bailey, 
Berg & Kalleberg, 2000; Batt et al., 2002; Shaw et al., 1998, 2009). Building on the work of 
Shaw and colleagues (1998, 2009), we examine investments and inducements (practices that 
invest in employees’ human capital and induce commitment), and performance-enhancing 
expectations (practices that enhance performance expectations). We also examine the role of 
work organization because considerable research has demonstrated its substantial relationship to 
turnover and performance (Appelbaum et al., 2000; Batt, 2002; Wood et al., 2006). 
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Work Organization 
Variation in work organization has grown in recent decades as employers have used 
different approaches to compete on price, quality, innovation, or time-to-market. Some 
organizations rely on Taylorized work design (individually-defined jobs with low discretion), 
characteristic of mass production systems, while others have promoted employee involvement 
and group problem-solving and learning. The large job characteristics literature provides 
persuasive evidence that Taylorized jobs demotivate workers and lead to higher turnover (Dalton 
& Todor, 1979); while higher discretion jobs are more intrinsically meaningful (Hackman & 
Oldham, 1980), leading to higher satisfaction, commitment, and lower quits (Wood et al., 2006). 
Approaches to work design that combine employee discretion with group problem-
solving are often defined as ‘high involvement work organization’. Drawing on concepts from 
total quality management (TQM) (Deming, 1982) and socio-technical systems (STS) (Trist, 
1981), this approach assumes that employees need discretion at work in order to utilize their tacit 
knowledge to diagnose and solve operational problems. These literatures also assume that 
problem-solving is best achieved through group collaboration: Under TQM, quality circles that 
discuss problems ‘off-line’ (away from work stations); and under STS, work organized into ‘on-
line’ teams, with considerable operational autonomy. 
Although some argue that team-based systems are potentially onerous because peer 
monitoring and enforcement of group norms may dominate individual discretion (Barker, 1999), 
even in Barker’s classic ethnography of self-managed teams, employees preferred teams over the 
prior system of Taylorized work. In settings such as call centers, where work tasks are 
individualized and scripted, opportunities for greater discretion and group interaction have been 
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found to relieve boredom, stress, and social isolation, leading to lower absenteeism and turnover 
and better sales performance (Batt, 1999, 2002; Deery, Iverson, & Walsh, 2002). 
While theory and evidence provide reasonable support that high involvement work design 
reduces quit rates (Arthur, 1994; Batt, 2002; Huselid, 1995), the predictions for dismissals are 
less clear. Dismissals may be higher than in Taylorized operations if those employees who have 
fewer skills or abilities are given more discretion, and they stand out as unable to perform; or if 
peer-monitoring exposes free-riders, leading to their discipline or dismissal (Barker, 1999). 
However, we believe that dismissals are likely to be higher in Taylorized systems because 
individual performance may be more accurately monitored and poor performers cannot free ride 
in their workgroups. In addition, high involvement systems provide a structure of cooperation 
and mutual learning in which employees who run into problems can obtain help from co-
workers. In sum, high involvement work organization may ‘raise all boats’ and lower dismissals. 
A less generous argument yields a similar hypothesis. Where workers have greater control 
over the work process, as in high involvement work systems, they can sanction managers who 
engage in what they view as unjustified disciplinary action (Klaas, Brown & Heneman, 1998) – 
yielding lower dismissal rates. In sum, the existing literature yields the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Work organization practices that enhance employee discretion and group 
collaboration will be associated with lower quit rates and lower dismissal rates. 
Long-term Incentives: Investment and Inducement Strategies 
The concept of investments and inducements draws on internal labor market theory which 
posits that higher relative pay, benefits, internal promotion opportunities, and procedures for 
employment security provide long-term incentives that lead employees to stay with the 
organization (Doeringer & Piore, 1971). Employers may seek low voluntary turnover to compete 
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on the basis of firm-specific skills or a unique human resource base. The empirical evidence of a 
negative relationship between investments and inducements and voluntary turnover is growing, 
including organizational studies that measure bundles of high involvement work and 
commitment-enhancing practices (Arthur 1994; Huselid 1995), as well as those with separate 
measures of inducements and investments (Batt et al., 2002; Shaw et al., 1998). 
However, the theoretical relationship between these long-term incentives and dismissals is 
undeveloped. Dismissals may be higher in these systems if employers are unwilling to make 
costly investments in employees whom they perceive as less able to perform or to learn new 
tasks. However, we believe that these incentives are more likely to motivate employees to avoid 
the types of behaviors that lead to dismissal. According to efficiency-wage theory, employees of 
firms paying above market wages should engage in less shirking, thereby reducing disciplinary 
problems that lead to dismissal (Cappelli & Chauvin, 1991; Klaas, Brown & Heneman, 1998). 
Generous benefit packages and internal career ladders should similarly engender this effect. 
Firms that invest more in the workforce may be reluctant to dismiss workers with this 
accumulated human capital (Klaas, Brown & Heneman, 1998), unless the employee misbehavior 
is egregious. The unfolding model of turnover also suggests that employee development plays 
the role of maintaining skills and reducing the likelihood of precipitating events that lead to an 
employee’s leaving a job (Lee & Mitchell, 1994). Finally, employers who attempt to compete by 
building a culture of trust and the synergies of social capital (Leana & Van Buren III, 1999) may 
try to limit overall turnover as much as possible because it disrupts the social fabric of work. 
Empirical support for these arguments is mixed. Shaw and colleagues (2009) found that 
HRM inducements were negatively related to the quits of both ‘good’ and ‘poor’ performing 
employees, significant for the former in study 1 and the latter in study 2. Knight and Latrielle 
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(2000) argued that high commitment practices should be associated with lower dismissal rates, 
but they only found a negative relationship between dismissals and profit-sharing. In sum, the 
bulk of existing theory and evidence suggest that inducements and incentives should have the 
same relationship to quits and dismissals: 
Hypothesis 2: Employment practices emphasizing inducements and investments will be 
associated with lower quit rates and lower dismissal rates. 
Short-term Incentives: Performance-enhancing Expectations 
The concept of performance-enhancing expectations (Shaw et al., 1998; Tsui et al., 1997) 
has advanced the literature by identifying distinct parts of the HR system that may differentially 
affect employee performance. Performance-enhancing practices are short-term incentives 
designed to respond to immediate competitive pressures to improve performance. They may 
include behavior-oriented measures (electronic monitoring, performance appraisals) and 
outcome-oriented measures, such as pay linked to employee performance. While theory suggests 
that they are often substitutes (outcome measures used for hard-to-monitor jobs), in fact, 
employers often view them as complementary. Where good service is viewed as an antecedent 
to sales (Schlesinger & Heskitt, 1991), as in service and sales settings, electronic systems 
monitor the quality of service interactions while commission pay provides incentives for sales. 
In theory, more extensive use of performance monitoring creates higher expectations and 
more onerous working conditions, leading to higher quit rates. Employees typically view on-
going electronic monitoring as an invasion of privacy and an indication of lack of trust, leading 
even ‘good performers’ to be dissatisfied and quit. Empirical studies show that electronic 
monitoring is significantly linked to higher job-related stress (Carayon, 1993; Deery et al., 2002; 
Holman, Chissick, & Totterdell, 2002), an antecedent to voluntary turnover (de Croon, Sluiter, 
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Blonk, Broersen & Frings-Dresen 2004), and higher quit rates (Batt et al., 2002; Shaw et al. 
1998; Wilson & Peel, 1991). It also should lead to higher dismissals because it provides accurate 
information about performance, assuaging employer uncertainty about whether claims of poor 
performance are accurate (Klaas, Brown & Henemann, 1998). However, the only study of these 
relationships found a positive relationship between performance appraisals and dismissals, but 
none between monitoring and dismissals (Shaw et al., 1998). 
Performance-based pay, by contrast, provides an outcome measure that sorts employees 
according to their ability to meet objective standards (Gerhart & Rynes 2003). The predictions 
for the relationship between performance-based pay and dismissals are consistent with our 
arguments regarding electronic monitoring. Pay-for-performance (in this case, commission-
based pay) provides clear, objective measures that allow employers to more accurately identify 
poor performers and dismiss them. 
The predictions for overall quit rates are less straightforward. They depend on the net 
effect of four factors. First, employees who perform poorly under these pay plans are likely to 
quit more, either because they find them onerous or because they anticipate being fired. Second, 
employees who perform well under these plans are likely to quit less than they otherwise would 
because they earn more (Harrison, Virick, & William, 1996; Lazear, 1999). One department 
store study found higher earnings for workers who received a base salary plus commission, 
rather than either a base salary alone or a commission alone (Patterson, 1992). Third, employees 
who perform well under these plans may nonetheless quit because they experience greater job-
related stress – pressure to sell and to be ‘on’ all day in order to make their commissions. 
A fourth factor that affects quit rates is the level of pay that is at risk and the level of risk 
aversion of the workforce. Most research on pay-for-performance has focused on pay that is not 
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at-risk (individual bonuses, merit pay, gain-sharing, profit-sharing over and above an employees’ 
normal pay) (Gerhart & Rynes, 2003). Commission pay is pay-at-risk, making weekly wages 
variable and uncertain. In addition, factors beyond workers’ control affect their commission 
levels: changing economic conditions, the product’s competitiveness, and variation in the 
customers that employees are assigned to serve. While companies may try to adjust the payout 
formula to improve the pay-for-performance link, research shows that this is quite difficult to do; 
and in uncertain market conditions when workers are more likely to be dissatisfied with payouts, 
employers whose profit margins are uncertain may be reluctant to increase the generosity of 
commission pay formulas. Thus, the impact of commission pay on quit rates is likely to depend 
on how risk averse workers are. Risk aversion varies among individual workers, but research 
has documented two general patterns. First, women have higher risk aversion than men (Byrnes, 
Miller, & Schaefer, 1999). Second, workers with lower skill levels and wages have higher risk 
aversion (Caroli & García-Peñalosa, 2002). Nadler and Wiswall (2009), for example, found that 
teacher support for a policy shift from scheduled, fixed-pay increases to merit pay was higher in 
school districts that offered higher base salaries and had a higher proportion of teachers with 
masters’ degrees (as opposed to bachelors’ degrees). Even here, however, the teachers would 
only support merit pay if their current base salary was guaranteed – that is, no pay-at-risk. 
The workforce in the current study is predominantly female (on average 70 percent), does 
not have a college degree, and receives a relatively low wage – considerably lower than teachers. 
Assuming that a large proportion of these employees are risk averse, many are likely to prefer 
the certainty of a stable weekly income over a variable one, even if the variable pay plan offers a 
somewhat higher annual pay. In this context, therefore, we believe that the net effect of these 
four factors will yield a positive relationship between the use of commission pay and quit rates. 
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Hypothesis 3: Performance-enhancing practices will be positively related to both quit rates 
and dismissal rates. 
HR Practices, Quits, Dismissals, and Performance 
Theory and evidence on the relationship between HR practices and organizational 
performance has expanded considerably in the last two decades, although questions remain 
unanswered. An exhaustive review of empirical studies concluded that, on average, high 
involvement work systems are associated with significantly higher operational performance 
(Combs, Liu, Hall, & Ketchen, 2006); and some recent studies have linked HR practices 
specifically to better customer satisfaction (Liao & Chuang, 2004). While studies differ in their 
approach to measurement, they typically include two dimensions examined here: high 
involvement work organization and commitment-enhancing investments and inducements. In 
theory, organizations that make greater use of high involvement work organization should have 
higher performance because they provide employees with the discretion and opportunity to 
collaborate to solve problems effectively. Commitment-enhancing incentives motivate 
employees to use their skills and discretionary effort to advance the interests of the organization. 
The concept of performance-enhancing expectations has not been part of the high 
involvement literature. However, organizations that make more intensive use of these practices 
should, in theory, experience better performance because these practices are designed to induce 
employees to meet immediate performance goals. 
Hypothesis 4a: High involvement work organization, investment and inducement practices, 
and performance-enhancing expectations will each individually be associated with higher 
levels of operational performance. 
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Theory also predicts that the synergies from these three types of HR practices should be 
multiplicative, but some studies have found evidence of interactions (Huselid, 1995; Shaw et al., 
2009), while others have not (e.g. Cappelli and Neumark 2004). These mixed findings suggest 
that it is worthwhile to further explore the synergies of these practices. 
Hypothesis 4b: The interactions of high involvement work, investment and inducement 
practices, and performance-enhancing expectations will be associated with higher levels of 
operational performance than the simple additive effect of these HR practices. 
Turnover and Performance 
The theory linking turnover and organizational performance is more equivocal (Bluedorn 
1982; Osterman, 1987). The link depends in part on which workers leave, and who they are 
replaced by. While the literature has assumed that more able employees quit more often, those 
with valuable firm-specific skills may stay, in part because their skills are less valuable 
externally. Studies finding that ‘better’ performers are more likely to quit (Wells & Muchinsky, 
1985; Tang & Frost, 1999) stack up against those that find the opposite (Martin, Price, & 
Mueller, 1981), while McEvoy and Cascio (1987) found a negative relationship between 
performance and both quits and dismissals, and Trevor and colleagues (1997) showed that high 
and low performers quit more than do average employees. The phenomenon also may be context 
specific. For example, Shaw and colleagues (2009) found that quits among good and poor 
performers in trucking were correlated at .58, but not at all in supermarkets. 
Similarly, while theory would argue that dismissing less able employees should improve 
performance, the only organizational study that differentiates quits and dismissals found the 
opposite: Higher dismissal rates in bank branches negatively affected customer satisfaction and 
cost per loan (McElroy, Morrow, & Rude, 2001). 
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Beyond this classic discussion about who quits or is dismissed, another line of argument 
focuses on the extent to which overall turnover – whatever its source – is dysfunctional because 
it contributes to higher costs and operational disruption (Hausknecht, Trevor, and Howard, 2009; 
Watrous, Huffman, & Pritchard, 2006). Regardless of whether an employee quits or is fired, 
recruitment and training costs are the same. Short-term productivity may be lower until the new 
employee becomes fully proficient (Batt, 2002) and longer term performance depends on 
whether the new recruit is more able than the dismissed employee, which is not certain if the 
organization’s labor pool and selection procedures are unchanged (Hausknecht et al., 2009). 
High overall turnover may raise transactions costs by: Requiring higher management-to-worker 
ratios; undermining workplace rules that form the basis of organizational control (Price, 1977); 
shifting resources and experienced workers away from daily work to train and socialize novices 
(Staw, 1980); disrupting the social fabric and bonds of trust and social capital that have been 
shown to positively affect performance (Shaw, Duffy, Johnson, & Lockhart, 2005); or lowering 
flexibility for internal redeployment or rotation across different jobs or skill sets. 
In sum, the relationship between turnover and performance is likely to be the complex 
result of multiple contingencies -- depending on the institutional, organizational, and market 
context of firms and on how performance is measured. Despite theoretical ambiguities, however, 
the preponderance of evidence is that total turnover and voluntary turnover are both negatively 
related to operational performance, and specifically to service quality and customer satisfaction 
(Kacmar, Andrews, Van Rooy, Steilberg, & Cerrone, 2006; McElroy et al., 2001). These 
arguments suggest the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5a: Quit and dismissal rates will be negatively related to operational performance: 
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These theoretical arguments also suggest that whether turnover mediates the relationship 
between HR practices and performance may depend upon the contingencies discussed above. 
Studies finding partial mediation for voluntary turnover include those by Huselid (1995), Batt 
(2002), and Way (2002). However, if indeed quit rates have a negative effect on performance 
and dismissals have a positive effect, as some have argued (Koys, 2001:111), then the mediating 
effect may be insignificant. The literature, then, suggests the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5b: The HR – performance relationship will be mediated by the additive effect of 
quit rates and dismissal rates. 
METHODS 
Sample 
The data for this study come from a 1998 stratified nationally-random survey of call 
centers in the telecommunications industry, based on the Dun and Bradstreet listing of 
establishments, and a 2003 nationally-random survey of call centers across all industries. 
Limiting the sample to organizations providing the same types of services enhances 
comparability and reduces extraneous sources of variation and measurement error (Becker & 
Gerhart, 1996: 792; Osterman, 1994). The longitudinal dataset includes telecommunications 
industry establishments surveyed in both 1998 and 2003; but due in part to the dot.com bust in 
the intervening period, only 40 percent of the 1998 sample was able to be identified in 2003. A 
response rate of 68 percent for the matched cases yielded a longitudinal sample of 97 centers. 
Identifying the 2003 population of call centers across industries was difficult because there 
is no official data on call centers, and many are located within larger organizations. By contrast, 
as a large proportion of establishments in telecommunications are call centers, they could be 
easily identified via initial screening. As a result, for 2003, we used the Call Center Magazine 
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subscription list, with over 60,000 subscribers. We pulled a random sample of subscribers who 
were listed as the general directors or managers of their centers, stratified by the industry they 
served. After exclusions for missing data on the variables of interest, the 2003 sample is 339 
establishments (including those in the longitudinal sample), while the longitudinal sample is 93. 
Both the 1998 and 2003 telephone surveys were administered by a university-based survey 
research institute to the senior manager at each center. It took 52 minutes on average in 1998 and 
45 minutes in 2003. Questions focused on call center agents, defined as the “core” workforce 
(Osterman, 1994). Given our large, nationally representative sample, it was not feasible to survey 
multiple respondents at each site. However, Gerhart, Wright, McMahan, and Snell (2000) note 
that establishment surveys are generally more reliable than corporate-level surveys as the 
workforce is much smaller, and the managers are generally knowledgeable about the HR 
practices they are responsible for implementing. The average size of the core workforce was 107 
in 1998 and 167 in 2003; the median size was 24 in 1998 and 73 in 2003. 
The 1998 and 2003 samples differed in minor ways, reflecting the changes in the overall 
economy as well as differences in the industries covered in the two periods. Mean quit rates were 
10.5 percent in the 1998 sample and 14.9 percent in the 2003 sample, while local unemployment 
rates averaged 4.6 and 5.4 percent respectively. Years of formal education averaged 13.6 years 
for the typical employee in 1998 and 13.4 years in 2003. Workforce size increased over time, 
reflecting the consolidation of operations into larger centers. Workforce size was also smaller in 
the longitudinal sample. More generally, it is important to recognize that there is an inherent 
selection bias in the longitudinal data in favor of establishments that continued to operate over 
this five-year period, likely selecting out poorer performing establishments. 
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Measures1 
Dependent variables. The four dependent variables provide indicators of quits, dismissals, 
total turnover, and customer satisfaction. The quit rate is the percentage of workers who quit 
voluntarily in the past year, while the dismissal rate is the percentage of workers who were 
dismissed. Total turnover is the percentage of workers who either quit or were dismissed in the 
past year. These measures exclude promotions, retirements, buy-outs, and lay-offs. Customer 
satisfaction is constructed from the mean of two standardized items (alpha= 0.59): the average 
level of customer satisfaction (1-5 scale); and the center’s customer satisfaction level compared 
to other competitors (1-5 scale, with anchors “much lower” and “much higher”). This provides a 
measure of operational performance, rather than cost-adjusted or financial performance. While 
this is a subjective measure, it is an important and widely discussed metric in this industry. 
Independent variables. We measured high involvement work organization by three 
variables: The extent of employee discretion; use of problem-solving groups; and use of self-
directed teams (see Batt, 2002). The discretion scale (MacDuffie, 1995; Batt, 2002) is the 
average of the extent to which employees have discretion (from none (1) to complete (5)) over 
operational issues, such as: daily tasks or assignments; tools or procedures; the pace or speed of 
work; setting daily lunch and break schedules; settling customer complaints without a supervisor 
(alpha = .77). Problem-solving groups is the percentage of workers involved in off-line groups 
with supervisors to discuss work-related issues. Self-directed teams is the percentage of workers 
organized into on-line semi-autonomous teams. The high involvement work index is the mean of 
the standardized values of discretion, problem-solving groups, and self-directed teams. 
Detailed definitions of all variables are found in Appendix 1. 
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All three of our HR indexes (high involvement work organization, investment and 
inducement practices, and performance enhancing practices) are additive -- conceptualized as 
composed of substitutable elements, which provide alternative means of achieving the same 
objective. We treat them as additive indices rather than as items in a scale representing an 
underlying latent variable – an approach well-established in the HR-Performance literature 
(Appelbaum et al. 2000; Batt 2002; Shaw et al. 2009). 
Investment and inducement practices are a slightly modified version of Shaw et al.’s 
measure (1998; 2009), which captures the use of internal labor market practices (internal 
mobility opportunities, relative pay, pensions, and employment security). Internal mobility 
opportunities are measured by the percentage of the core workforce promoted to higher positions 
or transferred within the larger organization. Transfers allow employees to move to jobs that 
provide experience for subsequent promotions or offer preferable working conditions or 
locations. Relative pay is the average annual pay (in dollars) of the typical (median) core worker, 
relative to the median wage of customer service employees in the metropolitan area or county in 
which the establishment is located (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2001). This definition of pay 
measures the relative attractiveness of the current job compared to local alternatives, which is 
likely to influence turnover decisions. The pension variable is a dichotomous variable, which 
equals 1 if employees are covered by a defined benefit pension plan, a type of long-term deferred 
compensation benefit used to tie employees to the firm. 
Employment security is the proportion of the workforce that is full-time and permanent, as 
opposed to contingent (part-time or temporary). While some argue that contingent workers may 
serve as a buffer to protect full time workers, research shows that they are often used for cost-
cutting (Houseman, 2001); and quit rates among core workers are higher in establishments 
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making greater use of contingent workers (Batt et al., 2002). In these cases, firms send a signal 
to core employees that their jobs are insecure because future cost-cutting may lead to converting 
more core jobs to contingent positions. In addition, the availability of contingent workers as 
substitutes for core employees puts downward pressure on the wages of incumbent employees 
(Katz and Krueger, 1999; Houseman, 2001), thereby unintentionally inducing higher quit rates 
among these employees. Combining these four measures, we constructed a standardized additive 
index of investments and inducements. The first three measures are also used in the Shaw et al. 
(2009) investments and inducements index. We add the fourth measure, internal mobility 
opportunities to capture the internal labor market theory based arguments that this is a key 
practice indicating long-term investments in and inducements for the workforce. 
Performance enhancing practices are measured by two commonly used practices in call 
centers: Monitoring intensity and individual commission pay. Monitoring intensity is the average 
of three questions: How often core employees receive statistics on performance; how often their 
calls are listened to by supervisors; and how often they get feedback on phone technique 
(frequency scale of 1-8, where 1 = never and 8 = daily) (Alpha = .66). Commission pay is the 
percentage of annual earnings of the typical core worker that comes from individual 
commissions (at risk pay). In this sample, 57.8 percent of establishments made no use of 
commission pay. Of the remaining 42.2 percent of establishments that made some use of it, the 
mean percentage of total pay that was commission pay was 27.1%. Overall, 11.2 percent of 
establishments had 1-9 percent of pay at risk; 15.6 percent had 10-25 percent at risk; 5.6 percent 
had 26-50 percent at risk; and 5.9 percent had >50-100% at risk. 
We standardized the monitoring and commission pay variables and constructed a 
standardized additive performance-enhancing practices index. Our approach is similar to that of 
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Shaw et al. (2009), who also used monitoring and performance-based pay in their expectations-
enhancing practices index. 
Control variables. We included several variables to control for market, organizational, and 
workforce characteristics. The local unemployment rate controls for variation in labor market 
conditions: Higher unemployment rates or alternative job opportunities are negatively correlated 
with turnover (e.g., Carsten & Spector 1987; Gerhart 1990). We control for industry 
(telecommunications versus others) as telecommunications is over-represented in the sample. 
Union coverage is a dichotomous variable (1=yes, 0=no), as a core workforce is legally defined 
as one bargaining unit, with complete union coverage or none at all. Controls for ownership 
include whether the center is in-house (owned by a primary firm, 1 = yes) or outsourced (owned 
by a subcontractor). A series of dummy variables captures the primary segment served by the 
center: large business, small business, residential clients, or all segments (the omitted category). 
We control for workforce size, (of the core workforce), as larger establishments may have more 
turnover due to a more standardized work environment. We also control for the age of the 
establishment, as older establishments may have more stable employment systems; and whether 
it had recent layoffs (in the last year), as research has shown that downsizing may undermine 
employee commitment, leading to higher quit rates (Trevor & Nyberg, 2008). 
To control for the human capital and demographic characteristics that may influence 
employees’ relative ease of movement, we include: The percentage of the workforce that is 
female (percent female); the average number of years of education of the typical worker at the 
site (average education) (Bretz, Boudreau, & Judge, 1994; Trevor 2001); and the number of 
weeks of initial training and on-the-job experience for workers to become fully qualified (initial 
training). These human capital controls are important to our argument because they help us to 
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identify the degree to which employment systems, rather just a higher quality workforce, affect 
quits, dismissals, and performance. Two particularly important control variables capture 
selection practices, as selectivity is a major competing explanation for variation in quits and 
dismissals. We measure the selection ratio as the percentage of applicants hired by the 
establishment and systematic selection procedures as the proportion of the core workforce that 
has been selected using systematic selection tests (psychometric tests or aptitude tests). 
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents the means, standard deviations, and bi-variate correlations for the 
variables. The average annual quit rate in this sample is 14.9 percent, the dismissal rate is 9.8 
percent, and average total turnover is 24.7 percent (with a range of close to zero to over 100 
percent). Note that the dismissal rate is much higher than prior studies of banking (5%, McEloy 
et al. 2001) or truckers (5.9%, Shaw et al. 1998), which may be partly due to the effectiveness of 
electronic monitoring in calling centers for identifying poor performers. Table 2 presents the 
estimation equations for the first three dependent variables (quits, dismissals, and total turnover), 
using the cross-sectional sample. Table 3 replicates these equations, using the longitudinal 
sample, with lagged HR index variables from 1998 to estimate turnover outcomes in 2003. Table 
4 presents the equations for customer satisfaction, using the cross sectional sample. 
- Table 1 about here -
Beginning with the simple bi-variate correlations, we find a striking degree of similarity in 
the predicted HR factors for both quits and dismissals. The high involvement work index is 
associated with lower quits (r=-0.28*)2 and lower dismissals (r=-0.18*). The results are similar 
for the individual practices in this index, including worker discretion (r=-0.25* for quits and r=-
0.20* for dismissals), problem-solving groups (r=-0.23* for quits and r=-0.14* for dismissals) 
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and self-directed teams (r=-0.12* for quits and r=-0.04 for dismissals). Similarly, the investments 
and inducements index is significantly associated with both lower quits (r=-0.33*) and lower 
dismissals (r=-0.25*). Individual practices comprising this index also have parallel results, as 
seen for internal promotion (r=-0.20* for quits and r=-0.22* for dismissals), relative pay (r=-
0.22* for quits and r=-0.09 for dismissals), pensions (r=-0.10 for quits and r=-0.20* for 
dismissals), and full-time and permanent workforce (r=-0.27* for quits and r=-0.11* for 
dismissals). The performance-enhancing practices index is positively correlated with both quits 
(r=0.24*) and dismissals (r=0.22*), with parallel associations for the components of this index --
monitoring intensity (r=0.27* for quits and r=0.20* for dismissals) and commission pay (r=0.08 
for quits and r=0.11* for dismissals). Thus, for all of the HR indexes and individual practices, we 
find initial support for the hypotheses 1, 2, and 3, suggesting similar antecedents for quits and 
dismissals. To further investigate these relationships, we now turn to our multivariate models. 
- Table 2 about here – 
Multivariate Analyses 
Estimation of multivariate models for our dependent variables requires accounting for the 
functional form of these variables, which are measured as rates, and therefore have a lower 
bound of zero (negative values are impossible). This produces a censored distribution, where 
only part of the normal distribution is observed. Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates for 
censored distributions produce biased estimates. To produce consistent estimates of the 
parameters, it is necessary to use a Tobit model for the estimation (Long 1997: 187-9). 
We begin by estimating base models consisting of market, organizational, and workforce 
controls as predictors of quits, dismissals, and total turnover (models 1a, 1b, and 1c in table 2). 
* Indicates significance at the p<.05 level. 
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Next we add the set of three HR indexes (models 2a, 2b, and 2c in table 2). Finally, we examine 
the interaction terms for the three HR indexes (model 3a, 3b, and 3c in table 2). 
Use of Tobit models in the estimation complicates the interpretation of effect sizes: The 
Tobit coefficients represent changes in the latent variable y*, rather than the censored variable y. 
For interpretation of effect sizes, the Tobit coefficients need to be multiplied by the appropriate 
conversion factors to produce the change in the observed censored variable y (Long 1997).3 For 
ease of interpretation, all effect sizes for variables in our Tobit models are reported in the text 
and tables as marginal effects in terms of percentage point changes in the observed dismissal, 
quit, and total turnover rates, calculated at the means of the variables. 
In the analyses, we found strong support for hypothesis 1: Organizations that make greater 
use of high-involvement work practices have significantly lower quit rates (p<.001, model 2a, 
table 2), lower dismissal rates (p<.05, model 2b, table 2), and lower total turnover (p<.001, 
model 2c, table 2). A one standard deviation increase (0.67) in the high-involvement index is 
associated with a 3.4 percentage point lower quit rate (0.67*-5.04), a 1.4 percentage point lower 
dismissal rate, and a 4.5 percentage point decrease in total turnover. 
We also found strong support for hypothesis 2: The investments and inducements index is 
significantly associated with lower quits (p<.05, model 2a, table 2), dismissals (p<.05, model 2b, 
table 2), and total turnover (p<.01, model 2c, table 2). A one standard deviation increase (0.63) in 
the investments and inducements index yields a 1.9 percentage point lower quit rate, a 1.5 
percentage point lower dismissal rate, and a 3.5 percentage point decrease in total turnover. 
3
 For a tobit model with a lower limit, the formula for the total change in the observed variable y is F(z)ß, where ß is 
the unadjusted tobit coefficient and F(z) is the cumulative density function for the probability of the observation 
being uncensored (Long 1997: 209). 
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Similarly, the performance-enhancing incentives index has the same (positive) relationship 
with quits and dismissals (Table 2). Organizations that make greater use of performance 
incentives have significantly higher quit rates (p<.001, model 2a), higher dismissal rates (p<.001, 
model 2b), and higher total turnover (p<.001, model 2c). A one standard deviation (0.65) 
increase in the performance-enhancing index is associated with a 3.3 percentage point higher quit 
rate, a 2.0 percentage point higher dismissal rate, and a 5.2 percentage point increase in total 
turnover. In sum, for all three HR indexes, the relationships between the index and both quits 
and dismissals are highly significantly and in the same direction. 
We investigated the possibility of interactions between the different HR indexes, which 
might indicate either complementarities or incompatibilities between these different approaches 
to HR management. Among the two-way interactions, the only significant result was for the 
interaction between the high involvement index and the performance-enhancing index and quits 
(p<.05, model 2a, table 2). The same interaction term for total turnover was marginally 
significant (p<.10, model 2c, table 2). These results indicate that the combination of higher 
scores on both of these indexes were associated with higher quits and higher total turnover. A 
three-way interaction term was tested as well (in analysis not shown), but was not significant. 
In addition to the findings for the employment systems variables, our results also indicate 
some interesting relationships between our control variables and both types of turnover. Notably, 
union representation is associated with significantly lower quit rates (p<.001, models 1a, table 2), 
dismissal rates (p<.05, model 1b, table 2), and total turnover (p<.001, model 1c, table 2). 
Compared to nonunion workplaces, the average union workplace has a 9 percentage point lower 
quit rate, a 4 percentage point lower dismissal rate, and a 13 percentage point lower total 
turnover rate. The association between union representation and lower quit rates supports 
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predictions from exit-voice theory that the union collective voice mechanism will reduce the use 
of the exit option of quitting in response to dissatisfaction (Freeman, 1980). This theory may also 
explain the negative association between union representation and dismissals as the voice 
mechanism may allow employees to correct poor performance before it leads to dismissal. 
Alternatively, it can be explained by just cause protections and effective union grievance 
procedures, which reduce the ability of management to dismiss employees (Colvin 2003). 
Also of interest is that establishments in labor markets with higher unemployment have 
significantly higher dismissal rates (p<.001, model 1b, table 2). Managers in these contexts may 
feel more latitude to dismiss under-performing or marginal employees as the local labor market 
provides a ready supply of potential replacements. Among other controls, establishments that 
employ a higher educated workforce have significantly lower dismissal rates (p<.001, model 1a, 
table 2), perhaps reflecting better job performance by employees with higher education or 
managerial assumptions that more educated workers are more trainable. Also, as anticipated, 
selection practices are significant: Organizations with higher selection ratios (lower selectivity in 
hiring) have significantly higher quits (p<.05, model 1a, table 2), higher dismissals (p<.01, 
model 1b, table 2), and higher total turnover (p<.01, model 1c, table 2). 
In a series of additional analyses (not shown) we explored the effects of other control 
variables. These included measures of differences in the types of services and sales that a center 
offers, as well as the level of competitiveness of the product market, which Bloom and Van 
Reenan (2006) show to be a powerful predictor of the adoption of good management practices. 
(Our competitiveness measure was whether the market was local/regional, national, or 
international in scope). These controls were not significant and did not change our findings. We 
also included a dummy variable in the longitudinal analyses for those establishments that had 
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switched to commission pay between the two time periods (11 percent of the sample). We found 
no significant effect and the findings did not change, suggesting that quits are not entirely driven 
by lower performing employees who quit because of the introduction of a new system. 
- Table 3 about here – 
We now turn to the analysis of our longitudinal data, which enables us to examine whether 
the use of HR practices in one time period has an effect on subsequent turnover. Turnover rates 
from our 2003 sample are regressed on lagged HR practice indexes from our 1998 sample. The 
five year lag period between the surveys in our study is longer than some other longitudinal 
studies. This has the disadvantage that if effects attenuate over time, it will be less likely that we 
will find significant effects of our 1998 predictors on our 2003 outcomes. At the same time, the 
relatively longer lag period makes for a more conservative test of our hypotheses, increasing our 
confidence that any significant effects we find are causal in nature. 
The results of the longitudinal analysis mirror those found in Table 2, but as expected, the 
significance levels are lower given the much smaller sample size of 93 establishments. The 
lagged high involvement work index is associated with significantly lower quits (p<.05, table 3), 
lower dismissals (though not significantly), and significantly lower total turnover (p<.10, table 
3). The lagged performance-enhancing index is associated with significantly higher quits 
(p<.001, table 3), higher dismissals (p<.05, table 3), and higher total turnover (p<.001, table 3). 
The associations for the lagged investments and inducements index are negative, but not 
significant. Thus, the longitudinal analysis supports the results of the cross-sectional analysis for 
the effect of performance-enhancing practices, and partially supports the effect of high 
involvement work practices. It is noteworthy that the longitudinal results provide some 
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consistent findings, given that we used a relatively conservative test involving a relatively long 
(five year) lag period and a considerably smaller sample size. 
- Table 4 about here – 
In Table 4, we present the results of our analysis of HR practices, turnover, and customer 
satisfaction. As in the analyses for turnover, we begin with a base model that includes only the 
control variables (model 1), then add the three HR indexes (model 2), and finally the interactions 
among the HR indexes (model 3). Our results show only partial support for hypothesis 4a: The 
high involvement index has a significant positive association with customer satisfaction (p<.01, 
model 2, table 4), but the other two indexes are not significant. A one standard deviation increase 
in the high-involvement index is associated with a 0.20 standard deviation increase in customer 
satisfaction (model 2, table 4). Also, there are no significant effects on customer satisfaction for 
two-way interactions between the HR indexes (model 3, table 4) or for a three-way interaction 
(analysis not shown), so hypothesis 4b was not supported. 
In the next three sets of models in Table 4, we examine the relationship between customer 
satisfaction and quit rates (model 4), dismissal rates (model 5), and total turnover (model 6). We 
find that organizations with higher quit rates have significantly lower customer satisfaction rates 
(p<.05); those with higher total turnover (quits and dismissals combined) have significantly 
lower customer satisfaction (p<.05). The relationship between dismissals alone and customer 
satisfaction is negative, but not significant. In terms of effect sizes, a one standard deviation 
increase in total turnover (i.e. an increase of 24.2 percentage points in the rate of quits plus 
dismissals) is associated with a 0.12 standard deviation decrease in customer satisfaction. These 
findings are consistent with hypothesis 5a, (which predicted that organizations with higher 
dismissals would have lower customer satisfaction). Model 6 also examines whether total 
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turnover mediates the relationship between the HR practices and customer satisfaction. Recall 
that all three HR indices are significantly related to total turnover (Table 2), and only the high 
involvement work index is significantly related to customer satisfaction (Table 4, model 2). 
We find that total turnover partially mediates the relationship between high involvement 
work organization and customer satisfaction. Following the standard mediation test procedures 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986; Muller, Judd & Yzerbyt, 2005), the high involvement index was a 
significant predictor of customer satisfaction (step 1 of the mediation test, model 2, table 4) and a 
significant predictor of total turnover (step 2, model 2c, table 2). When both the high 
involvement index and total turnover are included in the model, total turnover is a significant 
predictor of customer satisfaction (step3, model 6, table 4). When total turnover is included as a 
control (step 4), the coefficient of the high involvement index on customer satisfaction is smaller 
in absolute value (26.3=>23.8, models 2 and 6, table 4). Therefore, hypothesis 5b is supported 
for the high involvement work index, but not for the other HR indexes, which were not 
significantly related to customer satisfaction. 
Additional Analyses 
Although we focus our analysis on our three employment systems indexes, as a check on 
the robustness of our findings we also estimated models using the individual practices that make 
up these indexes. These results are shown in Appendix 2 and provide additional confirmation of 
our general findings. The relationships for almost all of the individual practices are in the same 
direction as for the indexes (with the exception of relative pay) and a large number of them are 
significant, albeit given that practices in the same index are capturing similar effects it is 
unsurprising that there is loss of significance for some variables in the full model. One notable 
finding is that both electronic monitoring and commission pay have significant positive effects 
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on quits, dismissals, and total turnover, which corresponds to our hypotheses and findings for the 
performance-enhancing practice index. This provides some additional support for our argument 
that these two practices have similar effects and can be linked together. 
In separate analyses (not shown), we further examined our assumption that the commission 
pay variable has a linear relationship to the outcomes of interest by creating a series of dummies 
for different levels of pay at risk (none; 1-9%; 10-25%; 26-50%; 51-100%). It could be, for 
example, that people who are less risk averse would self-select into jobs with high levels of 
commission pay (over 50%) and quit less because they are rewarded with higher pay. This was 
not the case. Relative to no pay at risk (the largest group), each of the 3 groups representing the 
highest levels of pay at risk (10-25%; 26-50%; 51-100%) had significantly higher quits, 
dismissals, and total turnover and the magnitude of the coefficients for the groups increased as 
the level of pay at risk increased. Even the first group representing the smallest amount of pay at 
risk (1-9%), which was not significant for quits, did have significantly higher dismissals. Thus 
our results suggest that commission pay does have a linear relationship with quits, dismissals, 
and total turnover. 
We also explored whether the turnover-performance relationship takes on different forms. 
Some researchers have called for analyses to provide a full empirical record of alternative 
possibilities, even when the theoretical arguments are ambiguous (Glebbeek and Bax (2004) 
argued that a curvilinear relationship should always be tested). The research record is mixed on 
whether the turnover-performance relationship is linear, curvilinear, or contingent on other 
factors (Alexander et al., 1994; Kacmar et al., 2006; Shaw, Gupta, & Delery, 2005; Siebert & 
Zubanov, 2009). In analyses not shown, we added a squared term for turnover to the turnover-
performance equation and found no evidence of a curvilinear relationship. This is consistent with 
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a recent study by Siebert and Zubanov (2009), who found a negative linear relationship between 
turnover and performance for core workers, but a curvilinear one for part-time workers who were 
a secondary workforce. As our study is of ‘core workers’, our findings of a negative linear 
relationship are consistent with this recent study. 
Some also have argued that turnover should moderate the HR-performance relationship 
because turnover should be more costly for organizations that have invested more in the 
workforce. Again, the research record is mixed on this point (Arthur, 1994; Shaw et al., 2005b; 
Ton & Huckman, 2008). In analyses not shown, we included interaction terms between total 
turnover and each of the three HR indices. Among the three interaction terms, one reached a 
modest level of significance (p<.10): the interaction of turnover and the high involvement index 
was negatively related to customer satisfaction. This would suggest that the lower the total 
turnover rate, the stronger the effect of the high-involvement work index on customer 
satisfaction. Put differently, high turnover would appear to weaken the performance enhancing 
effect of the high-involvement system. At a relatively low total turnover rate of 12.6 percent (a 
one-half standard deviation lower than the mean), an increase of one standard deviation in the 
high-involvement index produces a 0.30 standard deviation increase in customer satisfaction. 
Meanwhile, at a relatively high total turnover rate of 36.8 percent (corresponding to one-half 
standard deviation greater than the mean rate), the same increase of one standard deviation in the 
work organization index produces only a 0.13 standard deviation increase in customer 
satisfaction. Given the modest level of significance for the interaction term, however, these 
findings should be interpreted with caution. 
DISCUSSION 
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In this study we took an employment systems approach to understanding how human 
resource practices affect turnover and performance. We found that quits and dismissals have 
similar antecedents in HR practices. First, employers that made greater use of high involvement 
work organization had significantly lower quits, dismissals, and total turnover. Second, those that 
invested more in the workforce and offered long term incentives (internal promotion 
opportunities, high relative pay, pensions, and full-time jobs) had significantly lower quits, 
dismissals, and total turnover. Third, those workplaces featuring higher short-term performance 
pressures (intensive performance monitoring and commission-based pay) had significantly 
higher rates of quits, dismissals, and total turnover. Analyses using longitudinal data with lagged 
HR variables from time 1 predicting quits, dismissals, and total turnover at time 2 provided 
consistent evidence for these relationships. Since effects tend to attenuate over time, the use of a 
relatively long five year lag period provided a conservative test of our hypotheses and enhances 
the likelihood that the relationships we did find are causal in nature. Finally, employers who 
made greater use of high involvement work organization had significantly higher customer 
satisfaction rates, while those with higher quits and higher total turnover had significantly lower 
satisfaction rates. 
Whereas past research has generally theorized, and sometimes found, that quits and 
dismissals have distinct antecedents, we found the opposite to be true. The explanation we 
proposed is that employers view the level of turnover as a strategic variable that contributes to 
operational performance and they may achieve different turnover levels via the use of HR 
practices. We argued that high involvement work organization may, in effect, raise all boats: 
Employees quit less because their involvement in operational decisions and problem-solving 
creates more engaging and satisfying jobs; novices and poor performers benefit from the 
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structure of learning and motivation created through team-based forms of work. Similarly, 
drawing on logic of internal labor market theory, as well as efficiency wage theory, we argued 
that high relative pay and long-term incentives motivate all employees to avoid shirking – the 
less proficient as well as the more proficient -- because their current job is far more desirable 
than the external alternatives. Finally, HR practices that enhance performance expectations 
produce higher quits, as others have argued and found (Shaw et al., 1998), as well as higher 
dismissals, as the enhanced criteria expose employees who can’t keep up. 
Notably, our analyses controlled for alternative explanations related to the human capital 
level of the workforce and the selectivity of hiring practices. In particular, although we found 
that having a highly educated workforce and hiring a relatively small proportion of applicants are 
both associated with better performance, high involvement work practices were associated with 
higher levels of customer satisfaction even when we took into account these human capital 
related factors. 
Similarly, the turnover-performance literature generally has theorized that quits and 
dismissals should have opposite effects on performance, but the slim empirical evidence that 
exists does not support this theory. Our study contributes positive evidence that the combined 
level of quits and dismissals is significantly negatively related to customer satisfaction. This 
finding is consistent with the argument we made that quits and dismissals both contribute to 
operational disruption, which incurs the costs of replacing lost employees and undermines stable 
social relationships that provide the basis for workplace trust and collaboration, or social capital 
(Leana & Van Buren III, 1999). 
To make sense of our findings, it may also be useful to put them in the context of the call 
center sector, as we have argued that we believe the dynamics of turnover are highly influenced 
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by the context in which organizations operate. While call centers have a widespread reputation of 
being ‘electronic sweatshops’, employing low-skilled workers with little attachment to the labor 
force, in fact we observed a considerable range of variation in business and HR strategies and 
turnover in the centers we visited. This variation is evident in the descriptive statistics in this 
study. The average call center in 2003 offered annual wages of $33,794, with a standard 
deviation of $17,292. The telecommunications and banking industries, which are lead users of 
call centers and represent a large proportion of establishments in this study, have deep legacies of 
internal labor market practices that have not been entirely eroded. Call centers in the 
telecommunications sector continue to have high unionization rates (33 percent among call 
center workers), with particularly low quits, dismissals, and overall turnover. 
While we cannot empirically link our analysis to the business strategies of companies, our 
analysis may be picking up differentiation in employment systems and turnover related to 
differences in the competitive choices that establishments are making. Centers competing on 
customer loyalty may emphasize low turnover in order to provide high quality, stable, on-going 
services to customers. They are likely to invest in high involvement work organization and long-
term incentives and downplay monitoring and commission pay because the value proposition is 
based on long-term customer relationships, not on the quick sell. Other call centers compete on 
high volume, low-cost interactions, leading them to emphasize a Taylorized approach to work 
design in which the estimated costs of turnover are low because low-skilled labor is viewed as 
replaceable. In our study, high total turnover was associated with lower customer satisfaction – 
but this outcome may not be as important to those centers that compete primarily on low costs. 
To the extent that these establishments compete on short-term sales, the intensification of short-
term performance expectations may be particularly beneficial. 
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This explanation dovetails with the findings of a recent study of retail, a similar context to 
call centers, by Sierbert and Zubanov (2009). They differentiated between high commitment and 
secondary work systems within the same organization and showed that turnover in the secondary 
system was positive for performance at low levels, but eventually turned negative. Similarly, our 
findings may be driven by two types of systems operating in different establishments – a high 
commitment system with low overall turnover, focused on quality and customer loyalty, and a 
secondary system with high turnover in centers competing primarily on costs. 
There are several limitations to this study. The findings from the call center sector may not 
generalize to industries with different product and labor market conditions, technologies, skill 
requirements and work organization. Future research could valuably extend the current analysis 
to other industries and occupational groups. This study took an organization-level approach, but 
future research would benefit from multi-level analyses linking the individual and the workplace. 
A multi-level approach would also help sort out issues of causality, which we could only 
address to a limited degree through our lagged model for the longitudinal data. We used a 
relatively long five-year lag period, which increases the likelihood that effects are not due to 
simple correlations of variables over short periods of time, but increases the problem that the 
actual causal effects will become attenuated with time and hence less observable. This raises a 
larger question, which has not been adequately theorized in the literature, regarding what should 
be the appropriate time lag for testing a causal model of the relationship between HR practices 
and outcomes; and of course, this question will also depend on which HR practices and what 
types of outcomes. For studies of turnover, how long does it take for an employee to become 
dissatisfied with an employment system and quit? An ideal research design would track 
individual employees over time and conduct periodic surveys of stayers and leavers, which could 
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be aggregated to the organizational level. This approach would also go beyond an analysis of 
aggregate separation rates to include a more fine-grained study of how quits and dismissals affect 
the overall capacity of the organization to function and why. Another area for future research is 
to examine whether there is variation in the types of workers quitting or being dismissed under 
different types of employment systems. Future research, particularly if it combined 
organizational and individual level data, could examine the characteristics of the workers 
involved in turnover and see how this affects organizational outcomes. 
Finally, a general limitation of this study is that the data are based on reports from the 
general manager at each establishment, so we are unable to check for inter-rater reliability. 
However, the typical establishment in this study was small, and our measures are mostly based 
on objective information within the ready knowledge of respondents, which was investigated in 
fieldwork prior to the survey. Also, for this nationally-representative sample of establishments, 
we could not gather objective performance data, rendering our performance models only 
suggestive. However, our approach compares favorably to the other studies of voluntary and 
involuntary turnover that have been published to date – which rely on cross-sectional data and 
single establishment respondents (Donaghue and Castle, 2006; Shaw et al., 2005b, study 1). 
CONCLUSION 
Our study advances the past literature in two main areas. First, contrary to past research in 
this area, we found strong similarities in the antecedents of both quits and dismissals, suggesting 
that they are influenced by common processes relating to the type of employment system that 
exists in each workplace. Second, we found that quits and dismissals combined are significantly 
negatively related to customer satisfaction. 
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We want to emphasize that we are not challenging the notion that the dynamics of quits and 
dismissals may be different when we examine individual-level behavior or other industry 
contexts. And clearly, the dismissal of individual employees for poor performance may improve 
organizational performance if they are replaced by more capable individuals. Rather we are 
arguing that at the organizational level, the dynamics of quits and dismissals, and their 
antecedents and consequences, are contingent on many factors. This study presents a plausible 
theory and suggestive evidence that the relationship between HR practices, quits, and dismissals 
may function in similar ways in some circumstances. An employment systems lens shifts the unit 
of analysis to the organization and considers the ways in which employers may view overall 
turnover as part of the HR system – a set of tools to manage not only performance but headcount 
levels. The idea that employers search for ‘the optimal level of turnover’ (Siebert & Zubanov 
2009) is an emerging idea, worthy of further investigation. Thus, we believe that the different 
results that we have found provide the basis for future research that may examine these 
relationships with more precision and rigor and with other industries, occupations, and 
organizational contexts. 
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Table 1: Means, Standard Deviations and Bivariate Correlations for Variables 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Variable 
Quit rate 
Dismissal rate 
Total turnover 
Customer satisfaction 
High involvement work index 
Worker discretion 
Problem-solving groups 
Self-directed teams 
Investments and inducements index 
Internal mobility opportunities 
Relative pay 
Pensions 
Full-time and permanent 
Performance-enhancing practices index 
Monitoring intensity 
Commission pay 
Unemployment rate 
Telecommunications industry 
Union represented 
In-house center 
Large business clients 
Small business clients 
Residential clients 
Non-segmented clients 
Workforce size 
Female workforce 
Average education 
Initial training 
Selection ratio 
Systematic selection procedures 
Age of establishment 
Recent layoffs 
Mean 
14.88 
9.81 
24.69 
-0.02 
-0.11 
2.87 
33.80 
16.02 
-0.21 
0.21 
0.33 
0.48 
0.75 
0.15 
0.04 
0.11 
5.36 
0.42 
0.08 
0.86 
0.24 
0.10 
0.35 
0.32 
1.67 
0.66 
13.37 
0.35 
0.27 
0.39 
14.18 
0.21 
S.D. 
16.88 
12.04 
24.18 
0.89 
0.67 
0.74 
37.07 
33.12 
0.63 
0.29 
0.16 
0.50 
0.35 
0.65 
0.66 
0.22 
1.35 
0.49 
0.28 
0.35 
0.43 
0.30 
0.48 
0.47 
3.77 
0.24 
1.56 
0.40 
0.23 
0.46 
13.95 
0.41 
1 
1 
0.38 
0.89 
-0.14 
-0.28 
-0.25 
-0.23 
-0.12 
-0.33 
-0.20 
-0.22 
-0.10 
-0.27 
0.24 
0.27 
0.08 
-0.07 
-0.15 
-0.16 
-0.12 
-0.10 
-0.12 
0.10 
0.07 
0.12 
0.12 
-0.20 
-0.16 
0.19 
0.03 
-0.05 
-0.05 
2 
1 
0.76 
-0.12 
-0.18 
-0.20 
-0.14 
-0.04 
-0.25 
-0.22 
-0.09 
-0.20 
-0.11 
0.22 
0.20 
0.11 
0.19 
0.00 
-0.13 
-0.13 
0.02 
-0.13 
0.05 
0.02 
0.06 
-0.04 
-0.16 
-0.15 
0.20 
0.01 
-0.23 
0.13 
3 
1 
-0.16 
-0.29 
-0.28 
-0.23 
-0.10 
-0.35 
-0.25 
-0.20 
-0.17 
-0.25 
0.28 
0.29 
0.11 
0.04 
-0.11 
-0.18 
-0.15 
-0.06 
-0.15 
0.09 
0.06 
0.11 
0.06 
-0.22 
-0.19 
0.23 
0.03 
-0.15 
0.03 
4 
1 
0.16 
0.13 
0.11 
0.10 
0.05 
0.04 
0.06 
0.03 
-0.03 
0.01 
0.00 
0.00 
-0.07 
0.00 
0.01 
-0.01 
-0.02 
0.02 
-0.05 
0.06 
0.03 
0.03 
0.10 
0.07 
-0.10 
0.06 
0.02 
-0.06 
5 
1 
0.71 
0.70 
0.72 
0.38 
0.19 
0.38 
0.02 
0.33 
-0.16 
-0.41 
0.12 
-0.02 
0.21 
-0.12 
0.18 
0.20 
0.02 
-0.17 
-0.02 
-0.18 
-0.27 
0.35 
0.07 
-0.23 
-0.16 
0.11 
0.09 
6 
1 
0.22 
0.29 
0.36 
0.12 
0.43 
0.05 
0.29 
-0.07 
-0.38 
0.20 
-0.06 
0.25 
-0.05 
0.18 
0.17 
0.06 
-0.18 
-0.01 
-0.09 
-0.30 
0.39 
0.13 
-0.15 
-0.15 
0.02 
0.05 
7 
1 
0.26 
0.29 
0.22 
0.21 
0.06 
0.21 
-0.19 
-0.27 
-0.04 
-0.04 
0.12 
-0.09 
0.15 
0.18 
-0.06 
-0.12 
0.00 
-0.19 
-0.13 
0.21 
0.03 
-0.19 
-0.11 
0.13 
0.10 
8 
1 
0.16 
0.08 
0.18 
-0.07 
0.19 
-0.07 
-0.22 
0.09 
0.06 
0.08 
-0.11 
0.05 
0.09 
0.03 
-0.06 
-0.04 
-0.12 
-0.14 
0.15 
-0.01 
-0.15 
-0.08 
0.10 
0.03 
9 
1 
0.57 
0.64 
0.52 
0.68 
-0.16 
-0.36 
0.09 
-0.01 
0.23 
0.17 
0.31 
0.22 
0.06 
-0.19 
-0.05 
-0.08 
-0.27 
0.38 
0.18 
-0.29 
-0.04 
0.14 
0.06 
10 
1 
0.14 
0.11 
0.19 
-0.15 
-0.16 
-0.06 
-0.02 
0.04 
0.12 
0.15 
0.01 
0.04 
-0.09 
0.06 
0.02 
-0.12 
0.12 
0.10 
-0.05 
-0.04 
0.05 
0.01 
11 
1 
0.14 
0.29 
0.01 
-0.45 
0.34 
0.05 
0.16 
0.07 
0.17 
0.43 
0.07 
-0.24 
-0.19 
-0.13 
-0.45 
0.52 
0.15 
-0.20 
-0.07 
0.03 
0.18 
12 
1 
0.03 
-0.10 
-0.04 
-0.10 
-0.09 
-0.03 
0.24 
0.11 
0.06 
-0.10 
0.02 
-0.01 
-0.02 
0.02 
0.08 
0.06 
-0.14 
0.10 
0.07 
-0.02 
13 
1 
-0.13 
-0.25 
0.04 
0.03 
0.36 
0.02 
0.28 
0.06 
0.13 
-0.16 
0.02 
-0.06 
-0.12 
0.21 
0.11 
-0.27 
-0.08 
0.16 
-0.01 
14 
1 
0.54 
0.78 
0.02 
0.02 
-0.08 
-0.13 
-0.04 
0.07 
0.06 
-0.08 
0.10 
-0.11 
-0.06 
0.01 
0.14 
0.17 
-0.16 
-0.04 
15 
1 
-0.12 
0.06 
-0.20 
-0.04 
-0.24 
-0.18 
-0.07 
0.19 
0.02 
0.20 
0.22 
-0.33 
-0.20 
0.21 
0.25 
-0.19 
-0.12 
16 
1 
-0.01 
0.18 
-0.06 
0.02 
0.10 
0.13 
-0.06 
-0.11 
-0.03 
-0.30 
0.18 
0.15 
0.00 
0.03 
-0.06 
0.05 
17 
1 
-0.08 
0.00 
-0.07 
0.07 
0.08 
-0.04 
-0.08 
0.15 
-0.08 
0.06 
0.00 
0.01 
0.04 
-0.07 
0.11 
Values greater than or equal to 0.11 are significant at p<.05. 
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Table 1 (Continued) 
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18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Variable 
Telecommunications industry 
Union represented 
In-house center 
Large business clients 
Small business clients 
Residential clients 
Non-segmented clients 
Workforce size 
Female workforce 
Average education 
Initial training 
Selection ratio 
Systematic selection procedures 
Age of establishment 
Recent layoffs 
18 
1 
0.09 
0.26 
-0.15 
-0.04 
-0.12 
0.28 
-0.01 
-0.02 
-0.01 
0.07 
-0.14 
-0.05 
0.06 
-0.02 
19 
1 
0.09 
-0.04 
0.01 
0.01 
0.02 
-0.04 
0.16 
-0.08 
0.17 
0.02 
0.11 
0.08 
-0.05 
20 
1 
-0.09 
0.10 
-0.04 
0.06 
-0.09 
-0.08 
0.13 
0.15 
-0.23 
-0.13 
0.08 
-0.13 
21 
1 
-0.18 
-0.41 
-0.38 
-0.11 
-0.28 
0.28 
-0.02 
-0.09 
-0.03 
-0.07 
0.16 
22 
1 
-0.24 
-0.22 
-0.07 
-0.06 
0.09 
0.16 
-0.05 
-0.01 
0.04 
-0.04 
23 
1 
-0.50 
0.13 
0.17 
-0.13 
-0.09 
0.07 
-0.03 
-0.12 
-0.08 
24 
1 
0.01 
0.12 
-0.18 
0.02 
0.04 
0.07 
0.16 
-0.04 
25 
1 
0.08 
-0.11 
-0.04 
0.17 
0.08 
-0.03 
-0.03 
26 
1 
-0.45 
0.02 
0.05 
0.04 
0.18 
-0.16 
27 
1 
0.10 
-0.16 
-0.13 
-0.08 
0.12 
28 
1 
-0.03 
0.03 
0.17 
-0.02 
29 
1 
0.05 
-0.18 
-0.03 
30 
1 
-0.04 
-0.02 
31 32 
1 
-0.10 1 
Values greater than or equal to 0.11 are significant at p < .05. 
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High involvement work 
organization (A) 
Investments and 
inducements (B) 
Performance-enhancing 
practices (C) 
A*B 
B*C 
A*C 
Control Variables: 
Unemployment rate 
Telecommunications 
Union represented 
In-house center 
Large business clients 
Small business clients 
Residential clients 
Workforce size 
Model 1a 
TABLE 2 
Quits and Dismissals as Functions of High Involvement Work Organization, 
Investments and Inducements, and Performance-enhancing Practices (Tobit Models) 
Quits 
Model 2a 
-0.80 
(0.57) 
-4.91 ** 
(1.62) 
-9.05 *** 
(2.07) 
0.04 
(2.34) 
-2.92 
(2.16) 
-5.32 * 
(2.48) 
-0.62 
(1.91) 
0.30 
-5.04 
(1.35) 
-3.06 
(1.47) 
5.12 
(1.19) 
-0.86 
(0.55) 
-3.67 * 
(1.64) 
-8.59 *** 
(2.09) 
2.66 
(2.15) 
-1.52 
(2.17) 
-6.25 ** 
(2.30) 
-1.44 
(1.83) 
0.19 
Model 3a 
-16.16 ** 
(5.81) 
-0.88 
(6.20) 
-0.10 
(4.48) 
1.12 
(1.98) 
-2.03 
(2.22) 
4.35 * 
(1.92) 
-0.82 
(0.55) 
-3.54 * 
(1.64) 
-8.47 *** 
(2.10) 
2.67 
(2.16) 
-1.45 
(2.17) 
-6.17 ** 
(2.31) 
-1.01 
(1.84) 
0.21 
Model 1b 
1.37 *** 
(0.40) 
0.69 
(1.17) 
-4.01 * 
(1.63) 
-0.88 
(1.66) 
0.42 
(1.59) 
-2.49 
(1.79) 
0.37 
(1.34) 
0.02 
Dismissals 
Model 2b 
-2.14 * 
(0.93) 
-2.32 * 
(1.05) 
3.11 *** 
(0.84) 
1.36 *** 
(0.39) 
1.40 
(1.19) 
-3.47 * 
(1.70) 
0.80 
(1.56) 
1.44 
(1.63) 
-2.93 + 
(1.71) 
-0.07 
(1.30) 
-0.03 
Model 3b 
-3.26 
(4.04) 
-5.13 
(4.39) 
-0.80 
(3.16) 
-0.16 
(1.42) 
1.43 
(1.56) 
0.69 
(1.32) 
1.36 
(0.39) 
1.29 
(1.20) 
-3.37 
(1.72) 
0.62 
(1.58) 
1.34 
(1.63) 
-3.08 
(1.70) 
-0.09 
(1.31) 
-0.03 
Total Turnover (Quits+Dismissals) 
Model 1c Model 2c Model 3c 
0.67 
(0.83) 
-3.24 
(2.40) 
-6.67 *** 
(1.90) 
-5.56 ** 
(2.12) 
8.03 *** 
(1.71) 
0.64 
(0.80) 
-1.38 
(2.40) 
-12.97 *** -12.03 *** 
(3.26) 
-0.77 
(3.45) 
-2.45 
(3.23) 
-7.76 * 
(3.69) 
-0.72 
(2.79) 
0.25 
(3.32) 
3.55 
(3.20) 
-0.15 
(3.20) 
-9.44 ** 
(3.43) 
-1.95 
(2.66) 
0.09 
-20.30 * 
(8.27) 
-7.72 
(8.91) 
0.88 
(6.46) 
2.33 
(2.83) 
-1.12 
(3.16) 
4.51 + 
(2.72) 
0.71 
(0.79) 
-1.25 
(2.41) 
-11.65 *** 
(3.36) 
3.62 
(3.22) 
-0.24 
(3.20) 
-9.25 ** 
(3.46) 
-1.52 
(2.68) 
0.11 
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Percent female 
Average education 
Initial training 
Selection ratio 
Systematic selection 
Age of establishment 
Layoffs 
Constant 
Likelihood Ratio Chi2 
-2*Log Likelihood 
(0.20) 
4.21 
(3.81) 
-1.09 + 
(0.56) 
-4.07 + 
(2.16) 
8.04 * 
(3.60) 
0.97 
(1.67) 
-0.04 
(0.06) 
-0.60 
(1.91) 
38.35 ** 
(12.65) 
(0.20) 
4.04 
(3.79) 
-0.12 
(0.57) 
-3.67 + 
(2.02) 
4.54 
(3.50) 
-0.48 
(1.63) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
0.25 
(1.87) 
16.34 
(12.57) 
(0.20) 
4.46 
(3.83) 
-0.20 
(0.57) 
-4.10 * 
(2.02) 
4.48 
(3.49) 
-0.33 
(1.63) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
0.48 
(1.87) 
-0.42 
(20.77) 
66.90 *** 111.20 *** 116.50 *** 
2541.83 2497.52 2492.23 
(0.14) 
-3.21 
(2.68) 
(0.14) 
-2.85 
(2.69) 
-1.72 *** -1.14 ** 
(0.41) 
-1.82 
(1.47) 
6.94 ** 
(2.47) 
0.53 
(1.16) 
(0.42) 
-1.56 
(1.40) 
5.01 * 
(2.42) 
-0.28 
(1.15) 
-0.16 *** -0.13 ** 
(0.04) 
1.93 
(1.41) 
(0.04) 
2.49 + 
(1.40) 
33.78 *** 19.19 * 
(9.55) (9.62) 
(0.14) 
-2.93 
(2.73) 
-1.17 ** 
(0.42) 
-1.54 
(1.42) 
5.10 * 
(2.42) 
-0.38 
(1.15) 
-0.13 ** 
(0.04) 
2.60 + 
(1.40) 
9.53 
(15.61) 
83.57 *** 115.09 *** 117.18 *** 
2257.50 2227.98 2225.89 
(0.30) 
0.90 
(5.49) 
-2.59 ** 
(0.83) 
-5.88 + 
(3.07) 
14.93 ** 
(5.19) 
0.96 
(2.43) 
-0.19 * 
(0.09) 
1.84 
(2.84) 
64.87 *** 
(17.00) 
124.65 *** 
2069.47 
(0.29) 
0.62 
(5.41) 
-1.15 
(0.82) 
-5.33 + 
(2.87) 
9.90 * 
(4.99) 
-1.32 
(2.36) 
-0.09 
(0.08) 
3.28 
(2.75) 
33.43 * 
(16.69) 
(0.29) 
1.30 
(5.47) 
-1.23 
(0.83) 
-5.71 * 
(2.87) 
9.91 * 
(4.99) 
-1.26 
(2.36) 
-0.11 
(0.08) 
3.59 
(2.75) 
6.91 
(27.55) 
124.75 *** 71.13 *** 
2809.67 2863.28 
Marginal effects reported; N = 339; + = p < .10, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001 
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TABLE 3 
Longitudinal Analysis of Lagged HR Indexes on 
Quits, Dismissals, and Total Turnover (Tobit Models) 
High involvement work 
organization (Lagged) 
Investments and 
inducements (Lagged) 
Performance-enhancing 
practices (Lagged) 
Control Variables: 
Unemployment rate 
Union represented 
Large business clients 
Small business clients 
Residential clients 
Workforce size 
Percent female 
Average education 
Initial training 
Constant 
Likelihood Ratio Chi2 (F) 
-2*Log Likelihood (R-sq) 
Quits 
-6.31 * 
(2.89) 
-1.18 
(2.96) 
8.33 *** 
(2.07) 
-0.71 
(1.22) 
-4.19 
(4.87) 
-2.79 
(4.54) 
-8.85 ** 
(3.27) 
-3.45 
(3.55) 
0.48 
(0.37) 
7.27 
(6.54) 
2.01 
(1.38) 
-0.89 
(2.79) 
-40.10 
(38.70) 
25.42 * 
567.32 
Dismissals 
-2.09 
(1.87) 
-2.18 
(1.86) 
3.02 * 
(1.29) 
1.66 * 
(0.77) 
2.12 
(3.88) 
-3.49 
(2.49) 
-6.27 ** 
(1.86) 
-3.01 
(2.16) 
0.21 
(0.23) 
-10.81 * 
(4.14) 
-1.89 * 
(0.90) 
0.94 
(1.71) 
47.20 * 
(23.70) 
29.59 ** 
497.10 
Total 
Turnover 
-7.59 + 
(4.17) 
-3.14 
(4.26) 
10.57 *** 
(2.94) 
1.00 
(1.73) 
1.68 
(8.32) 
-5.96 
(6.37) 
-12.64 * 
(6.05) 
-9.10 + 
(5.03) 
0.63 
(0.55) 
-3.76 
(9.16) 
0.50 
(1.99) 
-1.69 
(4.00) 
9.03 
(44.34) 
21.51 * 
704.78 
Marginal effects reported; N = 93; + = p < .10, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001 
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TABLE 4 
Customer Satisfaction as a Function of Work Organization, 
Investments & Inducements, Performance-enhancing Practices, and Turnover (OLS Models) 
High involvement work 
(A) 
organization 
Investments and inducements (B) 
Performance-enhancing practices (C) 
A*B 
B*C 
A*C 
Quits 
Dismissals 
Total Turnover 
Control Variables: 
Unemployment rate 
Telecommunications 
Union represented 
In-house center 
Large business clients 
Small business clients 
Residential clients 
Model 1 
-0.050 
(0.037) 
-0.039 
(0.106) 
0.010 
(0.181) 
-0.167 
(0.152) 
-0.176 
(0.145) 
-0.084 
(0.183) 
-0.161 
Model 2 
0.263 
(0.085) 
-0.045 
(0.097) 
0.052 
(0.079) 
-0.050 
(0.036) 
-0.107 
(0.109) 
0.105 
(0.186) 
-0.174 
(0.154) 
-0.216 
(0.145) 
-0.087 
(0.182) 
-0.164 
Model 3 
-0.082 
(0.371) 
-0.115 
(0.405) 
0.271 
(0.293) 
0.177 
(0.127) 
-0.130 
(0.142) 
0.005 
(0.122) 
-0.049 
(0.036) 
-0.084 
(0.110) 
0.113 
(0.187) 
-0.135 
(0.156) 
-0.203 
(0.146) 
-0.053 
(0.184) 
-0.148 
Model 4 
0.236 
(0.085) 
-0.071 
(0.097) 
0.088 
(0.080) 
-0.007 
(0.003) 
-0.056 
(0.036) 
-0.132 
(0.109) 
0.049 
(0.186) 
-0.157 
(0.153) 
-0.234 
(0.145) 
-0.139 
(0.183) 
-0.179 
Model 5 
0.257 ** 
(0.085) 
-0.054 
(0.097) 
0.062 
(0.080) 
-0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.044 
(0.037) 
-0.099 
(0.110) 
0.091 
(0.187) 
-0.172 
(0.154) 
-0.212 
(0.146) 
-0.104 
(0.184) 
-0.166 
Model 6 
0.238 
(0.086) 
-0.073 
(0.097) 
0.088 
(0.080) 
-0.005 
(0.002) 
-0.046 
(0.036) 
-0.113 
(0.109) 
0.051 
(0.187) 
-0.159 
(0.153) 
-0.223 
(0.145) 
-0.142 
(0.184) 
-0.176 
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Workforce size 
Percent female 
Average education 
Initial training 
Selection ratio 
Systematic selection 
Age of establishment 
Layoffs 
Constant 
F 
R-sq 
(0.123) 
0.014 
(0.013) 
0.276 
(0.237) 
0.092 * 
(0.036) 
0.139 
(0.128) 
-0.450 * 
(0.227) 
0.124 
(0.107) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
-0.134 
(0.123) 
-0.839 
(0.626) 
1.25 
0.05 
(0.123) 
0.018 
(0.013) 
0.365 
(0.241) 
0.073 + 
(0.038) 
0.128 
(0.127) 
-0.409 + 
(0.229) 
0.141 
(0.108) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.143 
(0.122) 
-0.608 
(0.647) 
1.61 + 
0.08 
(0.124) 
0.018 
(0.013) 
0.433 + 
(0.245) 
0.075 * 
(0.038) 
0.125 
(0.128) 
-0.419 + 
(0.229) 
0.152 
(0.109) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.146 
(0.122) 
-0.973 
(1.070) 
1.52 + 
0.09 
(0.122) 
0.020 
(0.013) 
0.386 
(0.240) 
0.071 + 
(0.037) 
0.100 
(0.127) 
-0.375 
(0.228) 
0.134 
(0.107) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.143 
(0.121) 
-0.462 
(0.647) 
1.79 * 
0.10 
(0.123) 
0.018 
(0.013) 
0.353 
(0.242) 
0.070 + 
(0.038) 
0.121 
(0.127) 
-0.390 + 
(0.230) 
0.137 
(0.108) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.131 
(0.123) 
-0.553 
(0.651) 
1.55 + 
0.08 
(0.122) 
0.019 
(0.013) 
0.363 
(0.240) 
0.067 + 
(0.038) 
0.101 
(0.127) 
-0.363 
(0.229) 
0.131 
(0.108) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.128 
(0.122) 
-0.445 
(0.649) 
1.74 * 
0.00 
N = 339; + = p < .10, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001 
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Appendix 1: Variable Definitions 
Dependent variables 
Quits 
Dismissals 
Total turnover 
Customer satisfaction 
The percentage of workers who quit voluntarily in the past year, 
The percentage of workers dismissed in the past year, not including workers who were laid-off, promoted, or 
retired or quit voluntarily. 
The quit rate plus the dismissal rate. 
The mean of the responses to two standardized items (alpha = 0.59): 
• The average level of customer satisfaction (on a 1 -5 scale); 
• How the call center’s level of customer satisfaction compares to other call centers it competes with (on a 
1 to 5 scale, with anchors “much lower” and “much higher”). 
Independent variables 
Work organization and performance management 
High involvement 
Work organization 
Investments and 
Inducements 
Performance-enhancing 
expectations 
An index based on 3 items, standardized and averaged: 
• Discretion: an 8-item index of discretion over tasks, tools, pace of work, breaks, work methods, what to 
say to customers, handling additional customer requests, handling customer complaints (each item was 
measured with a 1 to 5 Likert-scale type question with anchors “none” and “complete”; the mean response 
for the 8 questions was 2.87) (alpha = 0.77) 
• Problem-solving groups: the average percent of workers in off-line problem-solving. 
• Self-directed teams: the average percent of workers in on-line self-directed work groups. 
An index based on 4 items, standardized and averaged: 
• Internal mobility opportunities: the percentage of the core workforce promoted to higher positions at the 
worksite or promoted or transferred within the larger organization. 
• Relative pay: ratio of the average annual pay (in $100,000’s) of the typical (median) core worker 
compared to the median wage of customer service employees (Occupation code 43-4051, OES survey) 
in the metropolitan area or county in which the establishment is located (BLS 2001). 
• Pensions: whether employees are covered by a defined benefit pension plan (1) or not (0). 
• Employment security: Proportion of the workforce that is full-time and permanent. 
An index based on 2 items, standardized and averaged: 
• Monitoring intensity. An index based on 5 items, standardized and averaged (response anchors for 
Likert-type scale questions are in parentheses after the item): How often core employees receive 
feedback on their performance (never-continously); how often their calls are listened to by supervisors 
(rarely-every day); how often calls are monitored without their knowledge (never-always); how often 
they get feedback and coaching on phone technique (rarely-every day); and to what extent information 
from performance monitoring is used to support disciplinary actions (not at all-a very great extent) 
(Alpha = .70). 
• Commission pay: The proportion of annual pay based on individual commission. 
Control Variables 
Human capital, workforce quality and demographic characteristics 
Female workforce 
Education level 
Initial training 
Selection ratio 
Systematic selection 
procedures 
The proportion of core employees who are women. 
Years of education of the typical core employee at the worksite. 
Number of weeks it takes for a full-time core employee to become fully competent on the job (E.g. able to 
train someone else). 
Proportion of applicants hired. 
Proportion of core workforce hired using systematic selection procedures (such as psychometric tests or 
aptitude tests). 
Market, Institutional, and organizational characteristics 
Unemployment rate 
Sector: Telecom 
Union coverage 
Customer segment: 
Ownership: In-house 
Size 
Age of establishment 
Local unemployment rate. 
In-house center serving telecommunications (1= Telecommunications, else 0). 
Whether the call center is covered by collective bargaining for core employees. 
A series of indicators for the primary customer segment served: Large business, small business, residential, or 
all (omitted category) 
Whether the call center is an in-house operation providing services to clients of one company or is a sub-
contractor providing services to other companies. (1 = In-house; sub-contractor = 0). 
Number of call center agents in the establishment (in 100’s). 
Number of years since establishment opened. 
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Appendix 2 
Quits, Dismissals, and Customer Satisfaction as Functions of High Involvement 
Work Organization, Investments and Inducements, and Performance-enhancing Practices 
[Models Using Individual Practices instead of Indices] 
High involvement work 
organization: 
Discretion 
Problem-solving groups 
Self-directed teams 
Investments and 
inducements: 
Internal mobility 
Relative pay 
Pensions 
Proportion full-time 
Performance-enhancing 
practices: 
Monitoring intensity 
Commission pay 
Total turnover 
Control Variables: 
Unemployment rate 
Quits 
[Tobit] 
-3.31 ** 
(1.27) 
-0.07 ** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-5.35 
(3.92) 
4.10 
(7.20) 
-1.40 
(1.62) 
-4.68 + 
(2.51) 
2.88 * 
(1.44) 
13.65 *** 
(3.97) 
-0.89 
(0.57) 
Dismissals 
[Tobit] 
-2.74 ** 
(0.86) 
-0.03 * 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-8.21 ** 
(2.70) 
3.16 
(5.05) 
-2.22 * 
(1.11) 
1.24 
(1.72) 
2.02 * 
(1.01) 
6.76 * 
(2.66) 
1.04 ** 
(0.40) 
Total 
Turnover 
[Tobit] 
-5.98 ** 
(1.80) 
-0.08 * 
(0.03) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
-14.30 * 
(5.57) 
8.24 
(10.29) 
-3.83 + 
(2.32) 
-3.54 
(3.63) 
4.76 * 
(2.07) 
20.72 *** 
(5.57) 
0.26 
(0.83) 
Customer 
Satisfaction 
[OLS] 
0.185 * 
(0.081) 
0.003 * 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.108 
(0.252) 
0.514 
(0.469) 
-0.063 
(0.107) 
-0.374 * 
(0.168) 
0.123 
(0.095) 
-0.177 
(0.258) 
-0.035 
(0.038) 
Customer 
Satisfaction 
[OLS] 
0.159 + 
(0.082) 
0.003 * 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.177 
(0.254) 
0.545 
(0.468) 
-0.079 
(0.107) 
-0.395 * 
(0.167) 
0.142 
(0.095) 
-0.084 
(0.262) 
-0.004 + 
(0.002) 
-0.033 
(0.038) 
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Telecommunications 
Union represented 
In-house center 
Large business clients 
Small business clients 
Residential clients 
Workforce size 
Percent female 
Average education 
Initial training 
Selection ratio 
Systematic selection 
Age of establishment 
Layoffs 
Constant 
Chi2 [F] 
-2* Log Likelihood [R-sq] 
Obs 
-4.06 * 
(1.87) 
-8.77 ** 
(2.18) 
2.77 
(2.25) 
-2.80 
(2.36) 
-6.64 ** 
(2.35) 
-1.79 
(1.94) 
0.17 
(0.20) 
5.91 
(3.97) 
-0.45 
(0.61) 
-5.45 * 
(2.36) 
5.16 
(3.61) 
-0.65 
(1.72) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
0.73 
(1.98) 
42.34 ** 
(12.92) 
123.7 *** 
2337.0 
321 
0.92 
(1.33) 
-2.37 
(1.87) 
1.15 
(1.59) 
1.07 
(1.75) 
-3.56 * 
(1.66) 
0.03 
(1.36) 
-0.00 
(0.14) 
-3.16 
(2.77) 
-1.22 ** 
(0.44) 
-1.51 
(1.59) 
5.05 * 
(2.46) 
-0.19 
(1.18) 
-0.15 *** 
(0.04) 
2.87 * 
(1.45) 
35.81 *** 
(9.64) 
127.6 *** 
2052.0 
316 
-2.12 
(2.72) 
-11.18 ** 
(3.56) 
4.02 
(3.35) 
-1.69 
(3.48) 
-10.48 ** 
(3.45) 
-2.35 
(2.82) 
0.11 
(0.30) 
2.45 
(5.66) 
-1.52 + 
(0.88) 
-6.79 * 
(3.27) 
10.81 * 
(5.17) 
-1.17 
(2.48) 
-0.09 
(0.09) 
3.81 
(2.89) 
70.03 *** 
(17.03) 
131.3 *** 
2602.0 
316 
-0.029 
(0.124) 
0.133 
(0.196) 
-0.146 
(0.163) 
-0.239 
(0.160) 
-0.060 
(0.188) 
-0.193 
(0.131) 
0.018 
(0.014) 
0.421 + 
(0.253) 
0.079 * 
(0.040) 
0.125 
(0.143) 
-0.399 + 
(0.239) 
0.129 
(0.114) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
-0.220 + 
(0.129) 
-1.318 + 
(0.673) 
[1.63] * 
[0.12] 
316 
-0.037 
(0.124) 
0.083 
(0.197) 
-0.130 
(0.163) 
-0.252 
(0.160) 
-0.118 
(0.190) 
-0.205 
(0.131) 
0.019 
(0.014) 
0.425 + 
(0.252) 
0.072 + 
(0.040) 
0.095 
(0.144) 
-0.350 
(0.239) 
0.119 
(0.114) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-0.204 
(0.129) 
-1.019 
(0.690) 
[1.71] * 
[0.13] 
316 
Marginal effects reported for tobit models; + = p < .10, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01, *** = p < .001 
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